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Amgen 25  270 374 203
Genentech 161  733 669 266
Serono 30  7 3 56
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Name Website  Field Included  IP  Information 
Sources  Search Advertising 
IP Database Search Engines 
CAMBIA 
Patent Lens*  patentlens.net General  Patents  Patent 
databases  Free N/A 
Delphion 
Research  delphion.com General  Patents  Patent 




patents  General Patents  USPTO 
filings  Free N/A 
PatentCafe patentcafe.com  General  Patents  Patent 
databases  Subscription N/A 
PIPRA* pipra.org  Agriculture  Patents  Patent 
databases  Free N/A 
Thomson 








Name Website  Field Included  IP  Information 
Sources  Search Advertising 
Thomson 
MicroPatent  micropat.com General  Patents  Patent 




pharma.com  Pharma Patents  Patent 
databases  Subscription N/A 
WIPO Digital 





database  Free N/A 
IP Exchange Platforms 
BirchBob birchbob.com  General Licensable 




com  General  Licensable 
technologies Submissions Free Per-listing  fee
MVS 
Solutions  mvssolutions.net General  Licensable 








technologies Submissions Subscription Subscription 



















































































































































































































































































































































































Brief Case Studies 
Here we briefly describe the features and identify some of the success factors of the IP access 
systems that we have discussed in this paper.  
 
1. Third-party informational clearinghouse (type I): Yet2.com 
Yet2.com was founded in 1999 with joint investment from Siemens, Bayer, Honeywell, Dupont, 
Procter & Gamble, Caterpillar, and NTT Leasing. It describes itself as a ‘technology marketplace’ 
and provides an online platform where technologies covered by one or more intellectual property 
rights that available for licensing can be listed and searched. There is also a facility for 
organizations with particular technology needs to advertise their requirements. It currently enjoys 
the support of most of the seven founding firms, as well as other leading R&D firms such as Agfa, 
Microsoft, Philips and Sony, and claims to have over 100,000 members.
20  
 
Yet2.com operates independently as a private profit-maximizing firm and aims to raise revenue 
from both potential licensors and licensees. Potential licensees can perform basic searches of the 
database of listed technologies for free, but more advanced searching and viewing complete 
details of listings requires purchasing a subscription. Listing technologies also requires a 
subscription, and Yet2.com charges a commission on any successful licensing arrangement 
made through its services, with a minimum charge of US$5,000. Exact details of the subscription 
prices and commissions are not publicly disclosed by Yet2.com. 
 
At the time Yet2.com was started, it was in competition with a number of similar online 
exchanges.





disappeared, including BioStreet, The Patent & License Exchange, and the Virtual Component 
Exchange.
22 Of the survivors, Yet2.com appears to be one of the most successful. A key factor 
underpinning its success is likely to have been its early establishment of a broad network of 
users, including well-known leaders in R&D. Achieving a critical mass in terms of its network of 
potential licensees and licensors meant that it was able to survive when other exchanges failed. 
 
2. Collective licensing clearinghouse (type IV): ASCAP 
ASCAP was established in 1914 and accepts membership from composers, songwriters, lyricists 
and music publishers in the U.S. It currently claims to have more than 270,000 members.
23 It sells 
licenses to radio stations, television networks, restaurants, and other businesses that wish to play 
(‘perform’) its members’ works. It then monitors the performances and distributes the license 
revenue less operating expenses to the members according to a set formula.  
 
ASCAP typically sells ‘blanket’ licenses that give licensees the right to perform any of the works 
of its members. Royalties are then usually collected as a set percentage of the licensee’s gross 
revenues. For licensees that only require occasional access to the copyright collection, ‘per-
program’ licenses are also available that permit performances for a specified period of time. A 
license from ASCAP is convenient for licensees, because it gives them access to the entire 
collection under a single agreement. Similarly, membership of ASCAP allows copyright holders to 
avoid the expense of making individual license agreements with licensees, and allows the 
members to exploit economies of scale in monitoring performances of their works. 
 
Since there are network effects in membership of a copyright collective, a factor in ASCAP’s 
success has been its ability to establish a large membership base. The larger the membership 
base, the greater the convenience to licensees, and the more they are willing to pay for a license, 
which flows through to the members. Although ASCAP faces competition for members from BMI 
and SESAC, it has been able to maintain a large membership in part due to its established 
network.  
 
3. Patent pool: MPEG-2 
MPEG-2 is a digital standard for encoding audio-visual information, and is used to specify the 
format of digital television and DVDs. The MPEG-2 standard is covered by hundreds of worldwide 
patents. In response to this patent thicket, the MPEG-2 patent pool was formed in 1997. It has 
expanded over time and currently includes 23 licensors that together own almost all of the 
relevant patents. The pool is administered by MPEG-LA, an independent limited-liability company 
that also administers several other patent pools.  
 
A license from the MPEG-2 pool grants access to more than 810 patents worldwide,
24 and the 
existence of the pool has been instrumental in the success of adoption of the MPEG-2 standard, 
with currently 1,155 licensees of the pool.
25 The license agreement specifies per-unit royalties for 
equipment that uses the MPEG-2 standard (such as DVD players) and for media encoded in the 
MPEG-2 format (such as DVD movies). Licenses are issued by MPEG-LA and it collects royalties 
and distributes them to the pool members. MPEG-LA also conducts the assessment of patents to 
determine whether they are essential to the standard.  
 
MPEG-LA attributes its success as being due to its independence from members, its rigorous 







that it provides to licensees who would otherwise have to negotiate a large number of license 
agreements.
26 Although the details of the MPEG-2 licensor agreements are not public, we also 
assume that rigorous structures must be in place to maintain stability of the pool, especially as 
some pool members are manufacturers of equipment that uses MPEG-2 and some are not.   
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